Ingénierie et gestion industrielles

Safety Performance of Complex Systems: Lesson Learned from ATM Resilience Analysis

Abstract

Giulio Di Gravio and Riccardo Patriarca

The Air Traffic Management (ATM) system has become steadily more complex due to rampant technological, procedural and societal developments and to the increase in traffic volume. These factors have become gradually more difficult to understand and manage, mainly because of tight couplings among functions and because of the continuous development characterizing everyday activities. According to this view, traditional safety analyses, basing on the belief that the systems are completely known and a causal-effect link could ever be easily detected may become ineffective. Furthermore, these methodologies can evaluate only linear causal dependencies. It is necessary therefore to evolve ATM risk assessment from its classic view of safety (Safety-I), to a new one, integrating the principles of resilience engineering (Safety-II). This editorial article presents the complexity and the outcomes deriving from resilience engineer methodologies, aiming at illustrating possible guidelines for managers and academics.